EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Financial Contracts in PIPE Offerings: The Role of Expert Placement Agents

Ola Bengtsson and Na Dai

Financial Management, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 795-832

Abstract: type="main">

We examine how Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) contracts allocate contingent cash flow rights between investors and issuers and the role of placement agents in PIPE contract design. Issuers advised by expert agents agree to more investor-friendly terms than issuers advised by nonexpert agents. Expert agents appear to help issuers understand the payoff consequences of negotiable terms. Moreover, expert agents allow issuers to negotiate more attractive pricing when they agree to investor-friendly terms. Issuers earn higher postoffering stock returns when they use expert agents or agree to more investor-friendly terms. These results suggest that the involvement of expert agents is beneficial to PIPE issuers.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/fima.12061 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Contracts in PIPE Offerings: The Role of Expert Placement Agents (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:795-832

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0046-3892

Access Statistics for this article

Financial Management is currently edited by William G. Christie

More articles in Financial Management from Financial Management Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:795-832