Illegal Insider Trading: Is It Rampant before Corporate Takeovers?

Atul Gupta and Lalatendu Misra

The Financial Review, 1988, vol. 23, issue 4, 453-64

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of insider trading as an explanati on for the observed preannouncement price run-ups for takeover targets. The authors hypothesize that if insider trading is a significant cont ributor to such price run-ups, then observed run-ups should be small for takeovers occurring after May 1986 (the beginning of the "insider trading scandal" ) relative to those occurring prior to May 1986. The evidence suggests that insider trading is not, on average, a significant contributor to preannouncement price run-ups. Copyright 1988 by MIT Press.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:23:y:1988:i:4:p:453-64

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0732-8516

Access Statistics for this article

The Financial Review is currently edited by Cynthia J. Campbell and Arnold R. Cowan

More articles in The Financial Review from Eastern Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().