Two-Stage Acquisitions, Free-Riding, and Corporate Control

Michael J Sullivan, Pamela P Peterson and David R Peterson

The Financial Review, 1990, vol. 25, issue 3, 405-19

Abstract: This study examines two-stage acquisitions, focusing upon first- and second-stage excess returns for both acquired and acquiring firms, and analyzing the relation between acquisition returns and ownership interest. The evidence suggests that target-firm shareholders do not free ride. Evidence is also provided indicating that premiums are paid by the majority holder to acquire a remaining minority interest. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

Date: 1990
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