Tender Offers and Target Management Responses: Managerial Entrenchment versus Stockholder Interest Revisited

Satish Thosar

The Financial Review, 1996, vol. 31, issue 1, 87-104

Abstract: Defensive actions by managements facing hostile tender offers have generally been interpreted as entrenchment-oriented behavior. In this paper, longitudinal wealth effects on target firm stockholders are examined for the 1978-1985 period. The sample of firms where target management resists the tender offer registers significantly higher post-tender offer announcement gains as compared to the sample of firms where target management remains passive. The evidence appears to support the stockholder interest hypothesis. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:31:y:1996:i:1:p:87-104

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0732-8516

Access Statistics for this article

The Financial Review is currently edited by Cynthia J. Campbell and Arnold R. Cowan

More articles in The Financial Review from Eastern Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().