Mergers, Method of Payment and Returns to Manager- and Owner-Controlled Firms

Virginia L Blackburn, Frederick H Dark and Robert C Hanson

The Financial Review, 1997, vol. 32, issue 3, 569-89

Abstract: Previous work provides evidence of disparate consequences for acquiring firms initiating stock and cash merger exchanges. These studies show that the choice of payment method and the subsequent consequences may be a result of dissimilar motivations. This paper addresses the role of corporate control by examining the consequences of stock, cash and mixed exchanges to manager- and owner-controlled firms. Particular attention is paid to mixed exchanges as a test of the total consequences of acquisition activity. The results indicate that the market valuation of the acquiring firm's stock is related to both the method of payment and the acquiring firm control structure. Copyright 1997 by MIT Press.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:32:y:1997:i:3:p:569-89

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