Geographical Deregulation and Competition in U.S. Banking Markets

Asghar Zardkoohi and Donald R Fraser

The Financial Review, 1998, vol. 33, issue 2, 85-98

Abstract: The effects of geographical deregulation on competition in banking markets is examined. Using a model that develops an index of competition as proposed by Bresnahan and applied to banking markets by Shaffer, the empirical evidence suggests that geographical deregulation has not had a significant impact on competition. The limited effects of geographical deregulation on competition is consistent with other evidence presented, suggesting that banking markets were already highly competitive. In those states where a significant effect was observed, geographical deregulation increased the degree of competition in some states but bad the opposite effect in others. Copyright 1998 by MIT Press.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:33:y:1998:i:2:p:85-98

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0732-8516

Access Statistics for this article

The Financial Review is currently edited by Cynthia J. Campbell and Arnold R. Cowan

More articles in The Financial Review from Eastern Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().