Why Some Firms Use Collar Offers in Mergers

Kathleen P. Fuller

The Financial Review, 2003, vol. 38, issue 1, 127-150

Abstract: Collar offers are merger offers using all stock as the method–of–payment that specify a range within which the bidder's price can fluctuate. In this paper the wealth effects associated with collar offers are determined, and cross–sectional regressions are employed to determine if this offer type is a significant determinant of abnormal returns. Results indicate that collar offers are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns for the target firm, even greater than those of firms receiving cash offers, but significantly negative returns for the bidder. These results raise an interesting question: why do some bidders make collar offers? Since the immediate wealth gains are strictly for the target and bidders making collar offers have returns insignificantly different than those making fixed stock offers, bidders must be utilizing collar offers for non–wealth related reasons. Using existing theories regarding the method–of–payment choice, various hypotheses for why firms may make collar offers are presented and tested using a multinomial logit analysis. The choice of collar offers seems to be significantly tied to the relative size of the merger, uncertainty regarding the bidder's value, and the target's and bidder's pre–merger insider ownership percentages.

Date: 2003
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