Corporate Governance and Asset Sales: The Effect of Internal and External Control Mechanisms

Robert C. Hanson and Moon H. Song

The Financial Review, 2006, vol. 41, issue 3, 361-386

Abstract: We investigate firms that sell assets to determine whether corporate governance mechanisms are effective at controlling agency problems. Our evidence shows that these firms have lower managerial ownership and are more likely to make unrelated acquisitions, suggesting weak internal controls. Analysis of insider trading activity shows that, on average, net buying increases before the asset sale and shareholders benefit more when this occurs. Results suggest that how managers reach a given level of ownership provides more information about incentive alignment than just the level of ownership. Our results also highlight the dynamic nature of corporate restructuring as firms acquire and then sell assets.

Date: 2006
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