Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss‐Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants

Anna Dodonova and Yuri Khoroshilov

The Financial Review, 2006, vol. 41, issue 4, 451-482

Abstract: This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of stock option grants in executive compensation. It shows that the optimal incentive contract for loss‐averse managers must contain a substantial portion of stock options even when it should consist exclusively of stock grants for “classical” risk‐averse managers. The paper also provides an explanation for the drastic increase in the risk‐adjusted level of CEO compensations over the past two decades and argues that more option‐based compensation should be used in firms with higher cash flow volatility and in industries with a higher degree of heterogeneity among firms.

Date: 2006
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