Lease Financing and Corporate Governance

Sara H. Robicheaux, Xudong Fu and James A. Ligon

The Financial Review, 2008, vol. 43, issue 3, 403-437

Abstract: Lease financing is a well‐recognized mechanism for reducing the agency costs of debt. This study examines whether firms that attempt to control the agency costs of equity through strong governance structures, including Chief Executive Officer compensation alignment and board structure, are more likely to use an agency cost reducing debt structure, such as leasing. For a sample of large firms, we find that firms who use more incentive compensation and have more outside directors also tend to use more lease financing, suggesting these agency cost reducing measures are complements.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:43:y:2008:i:3:p:403-437

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