Board busyness and financial leverage: The impact of corporate tax avoidance

Vu Quang Trinh, Teng Li, Oanh Ha and Jia Liu

The Financial Review, 2025, vol. 60, issue 3, 951-1002

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of “busy” independent directors on corporate financial leverage. Using a sample of 3321 Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2019, we find that firms with busier boards tend to have higher leverage, with corporate tax avoidance acting as a mediating mechanism. Supporting the reputational incentive hypothesis, busy boards discourage aggressive tax avoidance strategies that would otherwise allow managers to accumulate excess cash reserves. Consequently, these firms become more reliant on external debt financing to meet potential investment needs. Our findings highlight the role of “busy” independent directors in mitigating agency conflicts and shaping financial strategies.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finrev:v:60:y:2025:i:3:p:951-1002

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