EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Tax Competition, Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods

Michele Moretto, Paolo Panteghini () and Sergio Vergalli ()

German Economic Review, 2015, vol. 16, issue 4, 408-421

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="geer12058-abs-0001"> This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source-based taxation, in the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. The converse is true during a recovery: in this case, they are underprovided. In the long term, however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation. This means that the provision of public goods is unaffected by taxation.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/geer.2015.16.issue-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Competition, Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Competition, Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Competition, Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:16:y:2015:i:4:p:408-421

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1465-6485

Access Statistics for this article

German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin

More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2019-08-10
Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:16:y:2015:i:4:p:408-421