On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Judith Avrahami, Werner Gueth, Yaakov Kareev and Tobias Uske

German Economic Review, 2017, vol. 18, issue 1, 81-98

Date: 2017
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Journal Article: On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2017)
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German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin

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