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Pareto‐Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods

Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler

German Economic Review, 2000, vol. 1, issue 2, 169-186

Abstract: In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto‐improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto‐improving tax‐financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well‐being of contributors and non‐contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non‐contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non‐contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00010

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Journal Article: Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods (2000)
Working Paper: Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods (1998)
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German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin

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