Technology and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation

Luca Lambertini ()

German Economic Review, 2000, vol. 1, issue 4, 421-442

Abstract: The interplay between R&D activity and cartel stability is investigated in a vertical differentiation framework with convex costs. The behaviour of firms' critical discount factors as the curvature of the cost function varies is investigated, considering either price‐ or quantity‐setting behaviour. In order to stabilize collusion, firms are better off playing à la Cournot and supplying the non‐cooperative qualities. There emerges a tradeoff between the reduction of the convexity of the cost function and the associated increase in marginal cost. The decision to carry out joint or independent ventures in research is also investigated, showing that such a decision is non‐monotone in intertemporal discounting. Policy measures are then briefly discussed.

Date: 2000
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