Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core
Heinrich H. Nax
German Economic Review, 2019, vol. 20, issue 2, 243-256
Dynamics for play of transferable‐utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto‐dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non‐empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:2:p:243-256
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1465-6485
Access Statistics for this article
German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin
More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().