 Goal Setting, Information, and Goal Revision: A Field ExperimentMax van Lent German Economic Review, 2019, vol. 20, issue 4, e949-e972 Abstract: People typically set goals in settings where they cannot be sure of how they will perform, but where their performance is revealed to them in parts over time. When part of the uncertainty is resolved, initial goals may have turned out to be unrealistic and hence they no longer work as a motivation device. Revising goals may increase performance by making goals realistic, but may also adversely affect performance through reduced goal commitment. We study the effects of motivating university students to set goals and inviting them to revise their goals later, using a field experiment involving nearly 2,100 students. We use courses containing two midterms and a final exam, where midterms reduce uncertainty about students’ potential performance. We find that motivating students to set goals does not affect performance on average. Students with midterm grades lower than their goal, decrease their performance. This effect is driven by students who were motivated to set goals without being made aware that they can revise their goals later. This finding may help explain why the evidence of the effectiveness of goals on study performance is mixed. Date: 2019 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:4:p:e949-e972 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC. |
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