Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production
Bertil Holmlund ()
German Economic Review, 2002, vol. 3, issue 4, 415-430
Abstract:
Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e. unemployment benefits relative to after–tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when labor taxes are raised.
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00066
Related works:
Working Paper: Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production (2001) 
Working Paper: Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production (2000)
Working Paper: Labor Taxation in Search Equililbrium with Home Production (2000) 
Working Paper: Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:3:y:2002:i:4:p:415-430
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1465-6485
Access Statistics for this article
German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin
More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().