 The Club‐based Climate Regime and OECD Negotiations on Restricting Coal‐fired Power Export FinanceJessica C. Liao Global Policy, 2021, vol. 12, issue 1, 40-50 Abstract: This article examines the origin, process, and outcome of an understudied, but important multilateral climate change negotiation: the OECD negotiation to restrict export finance for coal‐fired power projects. It assesses how the United States – the OECD’s most powerful member – led the negotiations, and how Japan, South Korea, and China – a non‐OECD state – affected the negotiation’s outcome. It shows how internal and external dynamics of the negotiation under the shadow of China’s rising market influence shaped the preferences of Japan and South Korea in such a way that constrained US attempts to build new rules in curbing coal export finance. This research illustrates the collective action problem in an increasingly fragmented global governance landscape driven by transitions in global power. Contrary to critics that have identified China’s participation in multilateral organizations as weakening the global liberal order, this research shows that a ‘club‐based’ approach to this liberal order proved ineffective absent China’s participation. Date: 2021 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:glopol:v:12:y:2021:i:1:p:40-50 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Global Policy is currently edited by David Held, Patrick Dunleavy and Eva-Maria Nag More articles in Global Policy from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.