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The failed negotiations to restore the Iran nuclear deal

Tom Sauer

Global Policy, 2024, vol. 15, issue 4, 583-592

Abstract: When the Biden administration came to power, the hope was that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (2015), the so‐called Iran nuclear deal, would be restored. Due to domestic constraints and in the case of Iran also a valid alternative, both the US and the Rohani administration played hardball during the negotiations. As the Iranian nuclear program further advanced and the ties with Russia and China became stronger, the conservative Raisi administration was even less interested in reviving the nuclear deal. What remains are mini‐deals that are more advantageous for Iran than for the US. Billions of dollars of Iran are (or will be) unfrozen by the US, while Iran's break‐out time of its nuclear program has shrunk to zero days. Given that the overall goal of the international community (and especially the US) was to prevent Iran from building the bomb, one can only conclude that that policy has basically failed. Although Teheran has not built the bomb yet, it is now closer to the bomb than ever. Liberal theory and more in particular Putnam's two‐level game help explain this outcome.

Date: 2024
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