On the Conditional Success of International Conditionality Policies (With Evidence from Greece and Spain During the Eurozone Crisis)

Yannis Karagiannis and Nikitas Konstantinidis

Global Policy, 2015, vol. 6, issue 3, 212-221

Abstract: type="graphical" xml:id="gpol12198-abs-0002">

Whereas both governments faced strong market pressures to reform, they also differed in two theoretically relevant ways: PASOK was intrinsically motivated to reform, and it was subjected to high-powered incentives to do so; PSOE was not so intrinsically motivated to reform, and it was not subjected to high-powered incentives.

Date: 2015
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