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Responsibility Shirking at the United Nations Security Council: Constraints, Frustrations, Remedies

Kjell Engelbrekt

Global Policy, 2015, vol. 6, issue 4, 369-378

Abstract: The United Nations Security Council is the primary international body in charge of upholding international peace and security. Permanent and nonpermanent member states share in the responsibility to avert great power conflicts and thwart asymmetric disputes, regional instability and civil war, but the former task has priority and the prerogatives and therefore the obligations of the five permanent member states widely exceed those of countries that hold two‐year elected seats. The bifurcation of roles nevertheless produces ‘responsibility shirking’, which weakens Council performance on the latter type of tasks. This article suggests that responsibility shirking is underreported in the literature even though it is well known to diplomatic practitioners. It considers three types of remedies to the situation, arguing that amendments to the UN Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure are unlikely, but that piecemeal and pragmatic reform could precipitate a change of mindset. In particular, allowing nonpermanent member states to co‐chair the drafting of resolutions is likely to engage all member states in the core business of the Council.

Date: 2015
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12259

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