Affirmative action and school choice

Jose Alcalde and Begoña Subiza

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 10, issue 3, 295-312

Abstract: type="main" xml:lang="en">

This paper studies a way of introducing affirmative action in the school choice problem to implement integration policies. The paper proposes the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (equitable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley, when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's top trading cycle.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Affirmative Action and School Choice (2012)
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