Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
Maria Graziano (),
Claudia Meo and
Nicholas C. Yannelis
International Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 11, issue 1, 137-154
type="main" xml:lang="en"> An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. In this context, the notion of stable sets à la von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utilities. For the former, it is shown that the set V of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the latter, an example is presented which shows that the same set V is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:11:y:2015:i:1:p:137-154
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1742-7355
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano
More articles in International Journal of Economic Theory from The International Society for Economic Theory
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().