Stable sets for asymmetric information economies

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 11, issue 1, 137-154

Abstract: type="main" xml:lang="en">

An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. In this context, the notion of stable sets à la von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utilities. For the former, it is shown that the set V of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the latter, an example is presented which shows that the same set V is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies (2013)
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