Some equivalence results for a bargaining set in finite economies

Javier Hervés†Estévez and Emma Moreno†García

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 14, issue 2, 129-138

Abstract: We present a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin's () veto and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations, providing a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas†Colell () for continuum economies. We also study how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set. In the last part of the work, using our equivalence result along with some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set.

Date: 2018
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