Timing of entry and location/product differentiation

Chia†Hung Sun

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 14, issue 2, 179-200

Abstract: This research considers two alternative timing games, the precommitment game and the preemption game, where duopoly firms choose their respective timing of market entry and post†entry profits are generated by price competition in a spatial model à la Hotelling (). We find that the time of first entry is increasing and the time of second entry is decreasing in location differentiation. The results are robust and valid both from an equilibrium analysis and from a welfare analysis. We also note that the difference in equilibrium entry times is too close from the viewpoint of social welfare.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:14:y:2018:i:2:p:179-200

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