Social norms and cooperation

Bryan McCannon

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 14, issue 4, 303-307

Abstract: A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the prisoner's dilemma game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12160

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:14:y:2018:i:4:p:303-307

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