Data sharing agreements in vertically differentiated two‐sided markets

Juan‐Manuel Sánchez‐Cartas and Gonzalo León
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: J. Manuel Sánchez-Cartas

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 16, issue 3, 260-281

Abstract: We study the impact of data sharing agreements between two platforms with vertically differentiated consumers. We assume several utility functions to address the impact of those agreements under different market configurations. The results show that the follower always wants to share its network with the leader, while the leader has no incentive to share its network. We also prove that vertical two‐sided markets are quite prone to monopolies. Lastly, we show that regimes in which the leader shares its network are worse than not sharing at all.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12192

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:16:y:2020:i:3:p:260-281

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