Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

Antonio Romero‐Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 16, issue 3, 349-354

Abstract: We prove that group strategy‐proofness and strategy‐proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority‐based resource allocation problems with multi‐unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.

Date: 2020
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