Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies

Krishnendu Dastidar and Makoto Yano

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 17, issue 1, 101-117

Abstract: In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:17:y:2021:i:1:p:101-117

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