A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size

Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar and Sudipta Sarangi

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 19, issue 4, 830-854

Abstract: We propose and characterize a new value for TU cooperative games based on egalitarian distribution of worths in smaller coalitions and players' marginal productivity in larger coalitions. This value belongs to the class of Procedural values due to Malawski. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We show that our value is identical with the solidarity value due to Bèal et al. of the dual game. However, by duality, our characterization intuitively improves over the axiomatization of this solidarity value. We also provide a mechanism that implements our value in sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, a generalized version of this value is proposed followed by its characterizations.

Date: 2023
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