Petty corruption: A game‐theoretic approach

Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 4, issue 2, 273-297

Abstract: The paper explores a game‐theoretic model of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur, but its distribution is common knowledge. Each bureaucrat clears the project only if a bribe is paid. The bribe for qualified projects (“extortion”) and unqualified projects (“capture”) may differ. We identify the nature and welfare implications of different types of equilibria under appropriate technical assumptions on the structure of the game.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2008.00078.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach (2008)
Working Paper: Petty Corruption A Game Theoretic Approach (2008)
Working Paper: Petty Corruption A Game Theoretic Approach (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:273-297

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1742-7355

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano

More articles in International Journal of Economic Theory from The International Society for Economic Theory
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().