Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited

Takashi Ui

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 5, issue 3, 271-291

Abstract: This paper proposes the use of Bayesian potential games as models of informationally decentralized organizations. Applying techniques in team decision problems by Radner (1962), this paper characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of Bayesian potentials and demonstrates using examples that Bayesian potentials are useful tools for studying the efficient use of information in organizations.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00109.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:5:y:2009:i:3:p:271-291

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