Most games violate the common priors doctrine
International Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 6, issue 1, 189-194
The type of a player in a game describes the beliefs of that player about the types of others. We show that the subset of vectors of such player‐type beliefs which obey the consistency condition sometimes called the Harsanyi doctrine is of Lebesgue measure zero. Furthermore, as the number of players becomes large the ratio of the dimension Harsanyi‐consistent beliefs to the set of all beliefs tends to zero.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:6:y:2010:i:1:p:189-194
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1742-7355
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano
More articles in International Journal of Economic Theory from The International Society for Economic Theory
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().