Most games violate the common priors doctrine

Yaw Nyarko

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 6, issue 1, 189-194

Abstract: The type of a player in a game describes the beliefs of that player about the types of others. We show that the subset of vectors of such player‐type beliefs which obey the consistency condition sometimes called the Harsanyi doctrine is of Lebesgue measure zero. Furthermore, as the number of players becomes large the ratio of the dimension Harsanyi‐consistent beliefs to the set of all beliefs tends to zero.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00129.x

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