International Financial Rescues and Debtor‐Country Moral Hazard

Prasanna Gai and Ashley Taylor

International Finance, 2004, vol. 7, issue 3, 391-420

Abstract: This paper examines whether recent international policy initiatives to facilitate financial rescues in emerging market countries have influenced debtors' incentives to access official sector resources. The paper highlights a country's systemic importance as a key characteristic that drives access to official sector finance. It estimates the effect of these financial rescue initiatives on IMF programme participation using a pooled probit model. The safety net permitting exceptional access is shown to have a greater marginal impact on official sector resource usage, the more systemically important the debtor country. The results can be interpreted as offering some support for the presence of debtor‐country moral hazard.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00143.x

Related works:
Working Paper: International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard (2004)
Working Paper: International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard (2004)
Working Paper: International financial rescues and debtor country moral hazard (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:intfin:v:7:y:2004:i:3:p:391-420

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