Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies

Tony Dobbins, Tony Dundon, Niall Cullinane, Eugene Hickland and Jimmy Donaghey

International Labour Review, 2017, vol. 156, issue 3-4, 395-422

Abstract: This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations – specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive – on worker participation or “employee voice†in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual†gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs.

Date: 2017
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