Capital Regulation, Bailout and Banking Asset Correlation

Peng Sui and Dandan Zhou

International Review of Finance, 2019, vol. 19, issue 1, 83-103

Abstract: We study the effect of capital regulation on banking asset correlation. Banks are more efficient users of banking assets. This implies that it may be ex post optimal to bail out a failed bank. We show, under Basel 1 capital regulation, that the financial regulator is committed to a mixed bailout strategy in the state of systemic failure, which reduces banks’ incentive to choose highly correlated assets. The mixed strategy is not creditable under mark‐to‐market capital regulation. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, banking asset correlation increases, resulting in a high probability of systemic failure. We then discuss social losses under different capital regulations.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12178

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:19:y:2019:i:1:p:83-103

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1369-412X

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Finance is currently edited by Bruce D. Grundy, Naifu Chen, Ming Huang, Takao Kobayashi and Sheridan Titman

More articles in International Review of Finance from International Review of Finance Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().