Investment Decisions, Debt Renegotiation Friction, and Agency Conflicts

Hwa‐Sung Kim

International Review of Finance, 2020, vol. 20, issue 2, 493-504

Abstract: This paper investigates how investment decisions are influenced by the possibility of debt renegotiation failure and shareholder–debtholder conflicts by extending the Sundaresan and Wang (2007) model. We find that the difference in investment thresholds due to agency conflicts decreases as shareholders’ bargaining power increases. We also show that as the probability of renegotiation friction is lower, the investment threshold is lower, which is consistent with the empirical result of Favara et al. (2017).

Date: 2020
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