Monitoring and CEO Contractual Incentive Pay

Fan Yu

International Review of Finance, 2020, vol. 20, issue 3, 701-736

Abstract: This paper finds that a CEO who is better monitored tends to have smaller wealth‐performance sensitivity (WPS). The results are consistent with the optimal contracting view and are robust to different measures of WPS. The findings suggest caution in drawing conclusions when researchers use WPS as an observable outcome of monitoring to test the effectiveness of monitoring. The association of monitoring and WPS is not necessarily positive, as assumed by prior corporate governance research.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12238

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:20:y:2020:i:3:p:701-736

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1369-412X

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Finance is currently edited by Bruce D. Grundy, Naifu Chen, Ming Huang, Takao Kobayashi and Sheridan Titman

More articles in International Review of Finance from International Review of Finance Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().