A Theory of Currency Board with Irrevocable Commitments*

Alex W. H. Chan and Nai‐fu Chen

International Review of Finance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 3‐4, 125-170

Abstract: Currency boards are subject to runs if the foreign currency reserve is insufficient to back the convertible money supply. We construct a simple model and show how pre‐specified optimal reserve commitments can avert currency board runs. If there exists asymmetric information on the government's resolve, the government can also use commitments as a costly signal to induce a separating equilibrium. The model can be adapted to analyze other hard‐fixed exchange rate systems such as dollarizations and monetary unions. We illustrate the implications of our model in terms of the recent success in Hong Kong and possible remedies for Argentina.

Date: 2003
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