Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game‐Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

David Peel

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 1997, vol. 24, issue 9‐10, 1433-1435

Abstract: In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non‐disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real‐world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.

Date: 1997
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