 Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts in IPO ProspectusesVijay Jog and Bruce J. McConomy Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2003, vol. 30, issue 1‐2, 125-168 Abstract: Asymmetric information and mechanisms for its resolution in the initial public offering (IPO) process are subjects of extensive research and debate. In this paper, we investigate the impact of one such mechanism, namely voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts by issuers of IPOs, as a means of reducing asymmetric information as well as ex ante uncertainty. Our focus is on the relative importance of this voluntary disclosure mechanism on both IPO underpricing and post‐issue return performance. Our results indicate that management earnings forecasts provide important and incremental information compared to other means of reducing asymmetric information, and these disclosures appear to improve the environment of IPO issuance. For example, our underpricing results show that firms that choose to provide forecasts leave ‘less money on the table’ with a lower degree of underpricing. In terms of post‐issue performance, firms whose forecasts turn out to be optimistic are penalized significantly relative to other forecasters and non‐forecasters. Date: 2003 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:30:y:2003:i:1-2:p:125-168 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Business Finance & Accounting is currently edited by P. F. Pope, A. W. Stark and M. Walker More articles in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting from Wiley Blackwell |
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