Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News

Jeroen Suijs

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2005, vol. 32, issue 7‐8, 1423-1435

Abstract: Abstract: This paper shows that in a voluntary disclosure environment entailing both a fixed disclosure cost and a variable proprietary cost, partial disclosure equilibria may arise in which firms voluntarily disclose bad private information to the public. Furthermore, it is shown that such equilibria may arise more frequently as the threat of incuring proprietary cost increases and/or the proprietary cost itself increases.

Date: 2005
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