Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms

David Hillier and Patrick McColgan

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2009, vol. 36, issue 3‐4, 461-484

Abstract: Abstract: This paper investigates whether the family status of a company's top officer affects managerial replacement decisions. We report evidence that family‐managed companies are characterized by higher levels of board control and potentially weak internal governance systems. Family CEOs are less likely than non‐family CEOs to depart their position following poor performance. Stock prices react favorably and operating performance improves when companies announce the departure of a family CEO. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholders benefit when a powerful CEO leaves their position in the company.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02138.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:36:y:2009:i:3-4:p:461-484

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0306-686X

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting is currently edited by P. F. Pope, A. W. Stark and M. Walker

More articles in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().