 Is an M&A self‐dealing? Evidence on international and domestic acquisitions and CEO compensationJongmoo Jay Choi, Omer F. Genc and Ming Ju Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2020, vol. 47, issue 9-10, 1290-1315 Abstract: We examine the effect of international acquisitions on CEO compensation for US firms from 1995 to 2016 using both domestic acquisition and no acquisition firms as benchmarks. We find that acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO compensation (especially incentive‐based compensation), which is consistent with agency theory and inconsistent with stewardship or reputation theory. We also find that international acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO incentive‐based compensation than domestic acquisitions, supporting matching theory given that international acquisitions are larger and more complex to manage. Additionally, we document that CEO tenure has a positive effect on CEO compensation, whereas firm relatedness has a negative effect on post‐acquisition CEO compensation. This is the first study of its type based on comprehensive data, and it contributes to our understanding of the role of international and domestic acquisitions in CEO compensation. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:47:y:2020:i:9-10:p:1290-1315 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Business Finance & Accounting is currently edited by P. F. Pope, A. W. Stark and M. Walker More articles in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting from Wiley Blackwell |
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