EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic entry deterrence in the audit industry: Evidence from the merger of professional accounting bodies

Stephanie F. Cheng, Ole‐Kristian Hope and Danqi Hu

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2022, vol. 49, issue 1-2, 249-273

Abstract: Studies show that incumbents reduce prices in response to higher entry threats in consumer industries. We provide new insights on the importance of an incumbent firm's reputation to the limit‐pricing decision by examining a professional service industry where the supplier's reputation serves as an existing barrier. The recent staggered passage of mergers of three Canadian accounting certification bodies exogenously increases the probability of future entry to incumbent audit firms. Employing difference‐in‐differences analyses and a strict fixed‐effects structure (client‐firm, audit‐firm, province and year‐month fixed effects), we find that incumbent audit firms reduce audit fees in response to a higher entry threat induced by the merger. The microstructure of the audit industry provides further insights—non‐Big‐4 audit firms reduce fees after the merger, while Big‐4 audit firms can withstand higher entry threats and do not adjust fees.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12558

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:49:y:2022:i:1-2:p:249-273

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0306-686X

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting is currently edited by P. F. Pope, A. W. Stark and M. Walker

More articles in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:49:y:2022:i:1-2:p:249-273