Directors' Bankruptcy Experience and Financial Reporting Choices

Akram Khalilov, Irina Gazizova and Beatriz Garcia Osma

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2025, vol. 52, issue 3, 1631-1665

Abstract: We identify directors who experience a corporate bankruptcy and examine how this professional experience affects monitoring at the other firms where they concurrently sit on the board. Using a sample of US directors interlocked with firms that file for bankruptcy, we find that directors have a greater tolerance for real earnings management after a low‐cost bankruptcy experience. This effect is stronger for independent directors and those who sit on the audit committee, consistent with a ratification and monitoring explanation. We do not find evidence consistent with the competing hypotheses that bankruptcy leads to directors' distraction or incentivizes efficient cost‐cutting strategies. We contribute to the research on the influence of directors' corporate experience over corporate outcomes, by providing evidence suggesting that surviving a bankruptcy relatively unscathed lowers directors' perception of the severity of distress costs, with negative consequences for decision control.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:52:y:2025:i:3:p:1631-1665

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