Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality

Zhaoran (Jason) Gong, Lixin (Nancy) Su, Fujing Xue and Cheng (Colin) Zeng

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2026, vol. 53, issue 1, 181-206

Abstract: Using a large sample of US firms, we study the role of divisional managers in corporate disclosure quality. We find that when a company's divisional managers have previously worked with the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO) at other companies, in other words, they have co‐working experience, the company produces more accurate management earnings forecasts, experiences lower future stock price crash risks, and engages in less accrual‐based earnings management, consistent with the notion that co‐working experience facilitates internal communication, which, in turn, improves external disclosure quality. Moreover, the information‐enhancing role of the co‐working experience is more pronounced for firms with greater organizational complexity, more opaque internal information environments, and CEOs or CFOs who are relatively new to their positions. Overall, our results provide new insight into the role of divisional managers in shaping corporate disclosure and transparency.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.70013

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:53:y:2026:i:1:p:181-206

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0306-686X

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting is currently edited by P. F. Pope, A. W. Stark and M. Walker

More articles in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().