A Positive Theory of Information for Debt Contracting: Implications for Financial Reporting

Peter Demerjian

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2026, vol. 53, issue 2, 816-840

Abstract: Debt contracting creates demand for information from lenders to facilitate three distinct but related decisions: Lenders gather information prior to contract initiation for screening borrowers; later, once the contract is in force, lenders use information to assess changes in borrower default risk to determine the suitability of the initial contract terms; and finally, lenders collect information to ensure borrower compliance with information‐contingent contract terms. I examine what features of information are useful for these decisions, including whether the information is hard or soft; whether it is predictive or reflective; and whether the information includes just recurring components or whether it also admits non‐recurring information. Extensions of the base model are discussed to accommodate different institutional features of debt markets. I continue by considering how publicly reported financial information is potentially useful to lenders, and conclude by discussing avenues for future research.

Date: 2026
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