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Sex Preference, Marriage of Heirs and Bequest Behaviour

Junsen Zhang

The Japanese Economic Review, 2001, vol. 52, issue 1, 70-76

Abstract: This paper discusses some economic implications of sex preferences and the bequest behaviour of parents. A simple two‐period model with general assumptions is developed. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not exist unless constraints are imposed. However, such an equilibrium exists if bequests are non‐negative, if bequests to sons and daughters are equal or if preferences are heterogeneous. The model thus explains why such institutional constraints on bequests are observed in the real world, and why in some (developing) countries male children inherit the major wealth from parents. It also has useful implications for the debt neutrality proposition. JEL Classification Numbers: D1, J12, J13, J16.

Date: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:52:y:2001:i:1:p:70-76